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MODEL	DRESS	CODE:	
PROMOTING	GENDERLESS	ATTIRE	RULES	
TO	FOSTER	AN	INCLUSIVE	LEGAL	PROFESSION	
	
REBEKAH	HANLEY	&	
MALCOLM	MACWILLIAMSON1	
	
A	MEMORABLE	CONVERSATION	
	
I	knew	that	my	likelihood	of	being	able	to	wear	a	dress	to	court	was	
pretty	slim.		I	wasn’t	that	naïve.		At	the	same	time,	I	resented	the	notion	
that	at	no	time	in	my	future	legal	career	would	I	be	able	to	acknowledge,	
honor,	 or	 share	 the	 full	 complexity	of	my	 identity—that,	 by	 choosing	
law,	I	was	relinquishing	the	right	to	ever	be	fully	myself	in	my	profes-
sional	career.	
I	came	out	as	transgender	at	age	eighteen.		Shortly	thereafter,	I	began	
to	transition	socially	and	medically.		I	quickly	realized	how	much	of	my	
“self”	I	had	been	unable	to	acknowledge	in	my	yearning	to	be	recognized	
as	anything	other	than	what	I	knew	I	was	not—a	girl.		Early	in	my	tran-
sition,	 this	manifested	 as	 a	desperate	need	 to	be	 recognized	 as	male.		
Later,	though,	as	I	began	to	“pass,”2	feel	comfortable	in	my	own	skin,	and	
	
1 *	Rebekah	Hanley	has	been	a	faculty	member	at	the	University	of	Oregon	School	of	Law	since	
2004	and	served	as	the	school’s	Assistant	Dean	for	Career	Planning	and	Professional	Development	
from	2011	through	2015.		Earlier	in	her	career,	Professor	Hanley	clerked	for	two	federal	judges—
the	Honorable	Dean	D.	 Pregerson	 in	 the	Central	District	 of	 California	 and	 the	Honorable	Harry	
Pregerson,	United	States	Circuit	Judge	for	the	Ninth	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals—and	practiced	law	in	
Los	Angeles	with	Munger,	Tolles	&	Olson.		Malcolm	MacWilliamson	is	a	third-year	law	student	at	
the	University	of	Oregon	School	of	Law;	he	serves	as	a	legal	research	and	writing	tutor	and	an	OUT-
Laws	board	member.		The	authors	would	like	to	thank	their	Oregon	Law	colleagues	for	their	en-
couragement	and	support.	
2 “Passing	refers	to	a	transgender	person’s	ability	to	be	correctly	perceived	as	the	gender	they	
identify	as	and	beyond	that,	to	not	be	perceived	as	transgender.”		Jae	Alexis	Lee,	What	Does	“Pass-
ing”	 Mean	 within	 the	 Transgender	 Community?,	 HUFFPOST	 (June	 10,	 2017,	 11:13	 AM),	
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-does-passing-mean-within-the-transgender-commu-
nity_b_593b85e9e4b014ae8c69e099?guccounter=1&guce_refer-
rer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_refer-
rer_sig=AQAAAHaahKHyajyLT5RMSHVYItf42Aberl94r53ZVSJRZei0fYrCOnr3oUv-
Y7BnOmfPyYg1jSyaN8ed4sfiOzO9tiYMTvVdcbXR-_A3hNYqm3tTFNPXRSryxiBZsmmEejKhP0Im-
wSjsl11ATvzGAxOHl6XtAibFSmBYjR0LF1VNdJKI	
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recognize	the	face	looking	back	at	me	in	the	mirror,	I	also	found	myself	
exploring	what	I	had	long	ignored:	my	femininity.	
Exploring	my	femininity	was	a	radical	act.		Transitioning	provided	me	
with	the	comfort	and	courage	to	disregard	my	fears—the	fear	that	paint-
ing	nail	polish	on	my	toes	would	give	those	around	me	an	excuse	to	mis-
gender	me;	the	fear	that	donning	a	dress	would	undermine	my	identity	
as	“not	a	girl”;	and	the	fear	that	wearing	makeup	might	somehow	make	
me	 “less	 trans.”	 	And,	my	newfound	 freedom	 led	 to	another	develop-
ment:	 in	 addition	 to	 “he/him/his,”	 I	 embraced	 “they/them/theirs”	 as	
pronouns.		I	had	realized	that	I	do	not	fit	squarely	within	the	gender	bi-
nary,3	and	I	had	begun	to	embrace	myself	in	full.	
After	a	few	years	of	living	with	this	unparalleled	authenticity,	the	idea	
of	“going	back	into	the	closet”	was	an	entirely	unwelcome	one	for	me.		
During	law	school	orientation,	I	donned	my	suit	for	the	class	photograph	
and	wondered	if	the	credibility	and	reputation	I	hoped	to	establish	with	
my	peers	would	have	been	destroyed	before	they	even	knew	my	name	
if	I	had	worn	a	dress	to	the	event	instead.		I	wondered	how	the	judges	
addressing	 the	 first-year	 law	 students	 during	 that	 week	 of	 welcome	
would	react	if	they	noticed	my	nail	polish	and	earrings	in	their	court-
room.		Somehow,	despite	my	generally	masculine	gender	expression,	I	
was	completely	preoccupied	by	the	concern	that	I	might	never	be	seen	
as	a	 credible,	 reputable,	 and	successful	 lawyer	 if	 I	 acknowledged	 this	
facet	of	my	identity.	
Within	the	first	few	weeks	of	law	school	classes,	I	sought	advice	from	
the	first	professional	connection	I	had	made	in	the	legal	world:	my	legal	
research	and	writing	professor,	Rebekah	Hanley.		I	picked	nervously	at	
my	 fingernails	 as	 I	waited	 for	 her	 office	 hours	 to	 begin.	 	 I	was	 over-
whelmed,	shy,	and	incredibly	nervous	about	the	response	my	questions	
might	receive.	
Professor	Hanley	will	pick	up	the	story	from	here.	
If	students	are	anxious	when	they	visit	my	office,	they	generally	man-
age	to	hide	it	fairly	well.		Not	Malcolm.		He	had	come	looking	for	profes-
sional	 advice	 from	 the	most	 familiar,	 accessible	 law	 faculty	 member	
available.		Though	I	do	not	recall	seeing	him	pick	at	his	nails,	I	do	recall	
noticing	that	his	hands	were	shaking.		So	was	his	voice.	
	
3 For	the	basics	on	the	gender	binary	and	gender	variance,	see	Understanding	Non-Binary	Peo-
ple:	 How	 to	 Be	 Respectful	 and	 Supportive,	 NAT’L	CTR.	 FOR	TRANSGENDER	EQUALITY	 (Oct.	 5,	 2018),	
https://transequality.org/issues/resources/understanding-non-binary-people-how-to-be-re-
spectful-and-supportive.		
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“Based	on	your	experience	working	with	students,	and	in	law	firms,	
what	do	you	think	happens	if	I	show	up	for	my	summer	clerkship	inter-
views	in	a	suit,	but	I	wake	up	one	day	in	July	and	want	to	wear	a	skirt	
suit	or	dress	to	the	office?		I	mean,	I	haven’t	been	a	boy	that	long.		I’m	
still	.	.	.	figuring	it	all	out.		But	is	it	completely	out	of	the	question?”	
I	have	fielded	a	wide	range	of	student	questions	during	my	seventeen	
years	as	a	member	of	the	law	school	faculty,	including	four	years	leading	
the	school’s	career	center	as	an	Assistant	Dean.		But	Malcolm’s	question	
was	new,	and	it	caught	me	off-guard.		We	sat	in	silence	while	I	worked	
through	a	response	in	my	head.	
I	knew	what	I	wanted	the	answer	to	be,	for	Malcolm	and	others.		When	
I	teach	or	present	at	a	conference,	I	ordinarily	wear	a	dress.		I	gravitated	
to	the	same	kinds	of	clothing	when	I	clerked	for	the	federal	courts	and	
practiced	at	a	large	law	firm.		Around	that	default,	I	have	built	a	profes-
sional	wardrobe	that	reflects	my	identity,	personality,	budget,	style,	and	
comfort.		I	do	own	a	few	pairs	of	slacks	and	a	couple	of	pantsuits,	though,	
and	no	one	at	work	is	shocked	when,	due	to	convenience,	weather,	or	
whim,	I	appear	in	one.		Indeed—they	do	not	seem	to	notice	at	all.		I	want	
Malcolm	to	enjoy	similar	freedom	in	his	professional	life.	
But	my	responsibility	is	to	prepare	Malcolm	for	the	world	he	will	en-
ter—not	the	one	I	envision.		“That	feels	like	a	risk,”	I	said.		“Maybe	less	
so	in	Portland,	Oregon,	than	in	some	other	parts	of	the	country.		Still,	it’s	
hard	to	know	how	your	supervising	attorneys	would	react.		I	hope	they’d	
be	respectful.		I	hope	they’d	look	at	the	strength	of	your	work	ethic	and	
the	quality	of	your	work	product	and	not	the	cut	of	your	clothes.		But	I	
can’t	promise	that	will	be	the	case.”	
Preparing	students	like	Malcolm	is	not	my	only	responsibility;	I	also	
have	a	duty	to	improve	the	profession	that	Malcolm	will	enter.		I	have	
been	fortunate	to	benefit	from	the	tireless	efforts	of	female	lawyers,	sen-
ior	to	me,	who	were	sidelined	again	and	again	due	to	their	gender—un-
der-estimated	and	overlooked	by	hiring	partners;	excluded	from	busi-
ness	lunches	at	all-male	clubs;	and	excused	from	the	partnership	track	
due	 to	 a	pregnancy.	 	They	 fought	 for	opportunity,	 respect,	 and	 inclu-
sion—for	themselves	and	for	the	future.		Now	I	am	the	senior	lawyer;	I	
have	an	obligation	to	engage	in	similar	efforts	for	the	lawyers	who	fol-
low	me.	
Based	on	that	obligation,	and	inspired	by	Malcolm’s	bravery	and	au-
thenticity,	we	propose	and	explain	the	value	of	an	ungendered	model	
dress	code,	a	resource	that	any	legal	employer	might	draw	upon	to	craft	
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a	customized	office	policy	honoring	the	employer’s	commitment	to	pro-
moting	diversity	and	inclusion	in	the	legal	profession.	
	
THE	LAW	SHOULD	CATCH	UP	WITH	CULTURAL	PROGRESS:	
AN	ARGUMENT	FOR	GENDERLESS	DRESS	CODES	
I. ARGUMENT	SUMMARY	
This	essay	does	not	challenge	the	notion	that	legal	employers	have	an	
interest	in	establishing	a	professional	dress	code	and	a	right	to	do	so.		
Rather,	that	is	its	point	of	departure.	 	Employers	and	employees	alike	
benefit	from	clearly	articulated	standards	that	specify	employer	expec-
tations	 consistent	 with	 office	 culture,	 seasonal	 climate,	 and	 regional	
norms.4	 Employees	 deserve	 to	 know,	 rather	 than	 be	 forced	 to	 guess,	
whether	or	when	they	should	wear	business	suits	to	work;	which	days,	
if	any,	they	can	appropriately	don	more	casual	outfits;	and	what	kinds	
of	attire	are	acceptable	as	business	casual	 in	 their	workplace.	 	Work-
place	dress	codes	might	address	a	 range	of	 topics,	 including	garment	
length,	coverage,	condition,	and	cleanliness;	fabric	quality	and	type;	and	
absence	of	large	logos	or	graphic	images.	
However,	 legal	 employers	 should	 avoid	 sex-based—or,	more	 accu-
rately,	 gender-based5—distinctions	 in	 crafting	 guidelines	 for	 profes-
sional	attire.6	Even	though	the	law	permits	dress	codes	differentiated	by	
gender,	those	policies	are	antiquated	in	light	of	evolving	conceptions	of	
gender	identity	and	expression;	are	contrary	to	the	language	and	pur-
pose	 of	 Title	 VII;7	 and	 contribute	 to	 judgment	 and	 discrimination	 by	
	
4 See	Karen	Thornton,	Parsing	the	Visual	Rhetoric	of	Office	Dress	Codes:	A	Two-Step	Process	to	
Increase	 Inclusivity	and	Professionalism	 in	Legal-Workplace	Fashion,	12	LEGAL	COMM.	&	RHETORIC:	
JALWD	173,	174	(2015).	
5 Gender	may	or	may	not	align	with	sex.	 	 “Sex	 is	a	biological	 trait	 that	 is	determined	by	the	
specific	sex	chromosomes	inherited	from	one’s	parents.	.	.	.		Gender,	on	the	other	hand,	is	socially,	
culturally	 and	personally	defined.	 It	 includes	how	 individuals	 see	 themselves	 (gender	 identity),	
how	others	perceive	them	and	expect	them	to	behave	(gender	norms),	and	the	interactions	(gender	
relations)	that	they	have	with	others.”		Krista	Conger,	Of	mice,	men	and	women,	STANFORD	MEDICINE,	
https://stanmed.stanford.edu/2017spring/how-sex-and-gender-which-are-not-the-same-thing-
influence-our-health.html	(last	accessed	Dec.	30,	2019);	see	also	Denise	Grady,	Anatomy	Does	Not	
Determine	Gender,	Experts	S	ay,	N.		Y.	TIME	S	(Oct.	22,		2018),		https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/10/22/health/transgender-trump-biology.html;	 see	 also	 Cydney	 Adams,	 The	
gender	identity	terms	you	need	to	kno	w,	CBS		NEWS	(Mar	.	24,	2017),	
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transgender-gender-identity-terms-glossary/.	
6 See	 generally	 Sally	 Kane,	 Law	 Firm	 Dress	 Code	 for	 Men	 and	 Women,	 BALANCE	 CAREERS,	
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/sample-law-firm-dress-code-2164257	 (last	 updated	 Sept.	
16,	2019).	
7 See	42	U.S.C.	§	2000e	(1964).	
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forcing	gender	non-conforming	 individuals	 to	perform	an	 inauthentic	
identity.8	Legal	employers	with	a	stated	interest	in—and	business	need	
for—fostering	a	diverse,	welcoming,	and	affirming	environment	should	
craft	 a	 genderless	dress	 code	 consistent	with	 their	 inclusivity	 aspira-
tions.	
II. BEYOND	THE	BINARY:	SOCIETAL	RECOGNITION	OF	GENDER	FLUIDITY	ALONG	
A	SPECTRUM	IS	EXPANDING,	THOUGH	STUBBORN	MALE-FEMALE	
DISTINCTIONS	ENDURE	
The	 ongoing	 paradigm	 shift	 in	 societal	 conceptions	 of	 gender	 pro-
vides	the	backdrop	for	this	essay	and	is	worth	examining.	 	 Just	as	the	
“gender	revolution”9	is	changing	societal	norms,	it	is	also	changing	the	
relatively	conservative	and	risk-averse	legal	profession—albeit	slowly.		
This	essay	calls	upon	the	profession	to	accelerate	that	change	in	the	in-
terest	of	inclusion.	
First,	women	are	decreasingly	expected	to	dress	or	act	“femininely.”10	
Lawyers	who	present	as	 female,	 for	example,	now	generally	have	 the	
option	of	wearing	pantsuits	as	opposed	to	skirts.11	The	judges	and	other	
authorities	who	perpetuated	the	tradition	of	women	avoiding	pantsuits	
are,	one	way	or	another,	yielding	to	more	progressive	voices	 that	en-
courage	women	to	show	up	in	any	professional	attire	in	which	they	can	
comfortably	focus	on	completing	their	work.12	
More	importantly,	gender	is	decreasingly	viewed	as	given	or	fixed.13	
In	growing	numbers,	people	no	longer	expect	biological	sex	assigned	at	
birth	to	correlate	with	lifelong	gender	identity	and	expression—in	part	
because	they	know,	or	have	at	least	heard	about,	people	transitioning.14	
	
8 See	generally	Mirande	Valbrune,	Gender-Based	Dress	Codes:	Human	Resources,	Diversity	And	
Legal	 Impact,	 FORBES	 (Sept.	 28,	 2018,	 8:00	 am),	 https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeshumanre-
sourcescouncil/2018/09/28/gender-based-dress-codes-human-resources-diversity-and-legal-
impact/#8d83d904f535.	
9 See	generally	Susan	Goldberg,	We	Are	in	the	Midst	of	a	Gender	Revolution,	NAT’L	GEOGRAPHIC,	
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/pdf/gender-revolution-guide.pdf	(last	visited	Dec.	2,	2019).	
10 See,	e.g.,	Elizabeth	Kiefer,	Have	Millennials	Killed	The	Dress	Code?,	BUSTLE	(Aug.	21,	2018),	
https://www.bustle.com/p/have-millennials-killed-the-dress-code-10104742.	
11 See	Sally	Kane,	Law	Firm	Dress	Code	for	Women:	The	Good,	the	Bad,	and	the	Ugly,	BALANCE	
CAREERS,	 https://www.thebalancecareers.com/law-firm-dress-code-for-women-2164255	 (Aug.	
13,	2019)	.	
12 Id.		
13 See	generally	Grady,	supra	note	5.	
14 See	generally	Diana	Tourjée,	The	Girl’s	Guide	to	Changing	Your	Gender,	VICE	(Oct.	17,	2018,	
3:20	PM),	https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/43e899/male-to-female-transition-guide.		
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Some	of	those	people	who	have	transitioned	are	lawyers	who	have	en-
tered	the	profession	identifying	as	one	gender	and	transitioned	to	a	dif-
ferent	gender	while	practicing	law.15	
Further,	gender	is	no	longer	regarded	as	a	simplistic	binary—either	
culturally	or	legally.16		Some	stores	now	refuse	gender-based	differenti-
ation	 of	 children’s	 toys,	 clothing,	 or	 shoe	 sections.17	 Companies	 have	
created	new	products	to	fit	these	trends,	including,	for	example,	Mattel’s	
introduction	 of	 the	 “world’s	 first	 gender-neutral	 doll.”18	 In	 2019,	 the	
Merriam-Webster	Dictionary	officially	changed	its	definition	of	the	pro-
noun	“they”	to	encompass	its	use	in	reference	“to	a	single	person	whose	
gender	identity	 is	nonbinary.”19	Governments	are	following	these	pri-
vate-sector	leaders;	critically,	in	2017,	Oregon	became	the	first	state	to	
allow	residents	to	legally	identify	as	non-binary	on	a	driver’s	license	or	
identification	card.20	Just	two	years	later,	New	Hampshire	became	the	
thirteenth	state	to	do	so.21	
Widely	publicized	controversies	have	also	heightened	public	aware-
ness	of	 the	challenges	 faced	by	 individuals	who	do	not	 fit	neatly	 into	
male	and	female	categories.		For	instance,	legislation	requiring	that	peo-
ple	choose	which	public	bathrooms	to	use	according	to	the	sex	noted	on	
their	birth	certificate,	not	their	gender	 identity,	sparked	backlash	and	
	
15 See,	e.g.,	Ellen	Krug,	About	Me,	ELLIE	KRUG,	https://elliekrug.com/about/	(last	visited	Aug.	
13,	2019).	
16 Mainstream	society’s	growing	recognition	of	gender	as	more	than	a	“simplistic	binary”	is	not	
a	new	or	novel	perspective;	“[o]n	nearly	every	continent,	and	for	all	of	recorded	history,	thriving	
cultures	 have	 recognized,	 revered,	 and	 integrated	 more	 than	 two	 genders.	 Terms	 such	 as	
‘transgender’	and	‘gay’	are	strictly	new	constructs	that	assume	three	things:	that	there	are	only	two	
sexes	 (male/female),	 as	 many	 as	 two	 sexualities	 (gay/straight),	 and	 only	 two	 genders	
(man/woman).	 Yet,	 hundreds	 of	 distinct	 societies	 around	 the	 globe	have	 their	 own	 long-estab-
lished	traditions	for	third,	fourth,	fifth,	or	more	genders.	.	.	.	Most	Western	societies	have	no	direct	
correlation	for	.	.	.	the	many	[]	communities	without	strict	either/or	conceptions	of	sex,	sexuality,	
and	gender.	Worldwide,	the	sheer	variety	of	gender	expression	is	almost	limitless.”	See	A	Map	of	
Gender-Diverse	Cultures,	PBS	(Aug.	11,	2015),	http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/content/two-
spirits_map-html/.	
17 See,	 What’s	 in	 Store:	 Moving	 Away	 from	 Gender-based	 Signs,	 TARGET	 (Aug.	 7,	 2015),	
https://corporate.target.com/article/2015/08/gender-based-signs-corporate.	
18 See	Eliana	Dockterman,	‘A	Doll	For	Everyone’:	Meet	Mattel’s	Gender-Neutral	Doll,	TIME	(Sept.	
25,	2019),	https://time.com/5684822/mattel-gender-neutral-doll/.	
19 See	Kendall	Trammell,	Merriam-Webster	Adds	the	Nonbinary	Pronoun	‘they’	to	its	Dictionary,	
CNN,		 https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/17/us/merriam-webster-nonbinary-pronoun-they-
trnd/index.html	(last	updated	Sept.	18,	2019,	6:27	AM).		
20 See	 Casey	 Parks,	 Oregon	 Becomes	 First	 State	 to	 Allow	 Nonbinary	 on	 Drivers	 License,	
OREGONIAN,	https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2017/06/oregon_becomes_first_state_to.html	
(last	updated	June	15,	2017).		
21 See	Jordyn	Haime,	N.H.	Becomes	13th	State	to	Add	Non-Binary	Gender	Option	on	Drivers	Li-
censes,	N.H.	PUB.	RADIO	(July	11,	2019),	https://www.nhpr.org/post/nh-becomes-13th-state-add-
non-binary-gender-option-drivers-licenses#stream/0.	
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legal	challenges.22	In	the	wake	of	that	controversy,	gender-neutral	bath-
rooms	are	becoming	more	common.23	
Competitive	athletics,	which	are	as	binarized	as	bathrooms,	have	pro-
vided	another	source	of	awareness-raising	controversy.		When	a	would-
be	competitor	cannot	satisfy	the	standards	used	to	sort	participants	into	
male	 and	 female	 categories—the	 only	 two	 categories	 available—the	
consequences	prompt	concerns	about	fairness	and	privacy,	along	with	
questions	regarding	potential	redefinition:	how	should	organizers	de-
fine	male	and	female	eligibility	now	that	gender	is	known	to	be	a	spec-
trum	and	neither	sex	nor	gender	is	fixed?24	While	people	will	disagree	
about	the	best	strategy	for	including	a	particular	athlete	in	competition,	
the	mere	existence	of	that	disagreement	may	itself	be	proof	of	some	con-
sensus	that	gender	is	not	a	simple	binary.	
Notwithstanding	 the	 emerging	 understanding	 of	 gender	 as	 a	 spec-
trum	and	the	growing	acceptance	of	gender	fluidity,	both	written	and	
unwritten	binary	professional	attire	expectations	persist.		These	endur-
ing,	outdated	expectations	perpetuate	judgment	of	and	discrimination	
against	 those	who	will	 not—or	 cannot—comply.25	 Gender-differenti-
ated	dress	codes	and	norms	(like	public	restrooms,	sports,	and	so	many	
other	aspects	of	mainstream	society)	are	premised	on	the	basic	assump-
tion	that	gender	is	binary.26	That	basic	assumption	is	false.		Employers	
should	not	perpetuate	routines	that	rely	on	a	false	premise.		Anything	
built	upon	a	crumbling	foundation	will	not	stand.	
	
22 See	Merrit	Kennedy,	North	Carolina	Reaches	Settlement	in	Long	Battle	Over	Bathrooms	and	
Gender	Identity,	NPR	(July	23,	2019),	https://www.npr.org/2019/07/23/744488752/north-caro-
lina-reaches-settlement-in-long-battle-over-bathrooms-and-gender-ident.	
23 	See,	e.g.,	Allison	Needles,	Here’s	What	Those	New	Signs	on	Some	Public	Restrooms	in	Tacoma	
Mean,	NEWS	TRIBUNE,	https://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article231663373.html	(last	
updated	June	18,	2019,	3:55	PM);	see	also	Allison	Kite,	New	KCI	Terminal	Will	Offer	All-Gender	Bath-
rooms,	Other	Inclusive	Features,	KANSAS	CITY	STAR,	https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/arti-
cle238272348.html	(updated	Dec.	11,	2019,	4:18	PM).	
24 See,	e.g.,	Paul	MacInnes,	Caster	Semenya	blocked	from	competing	at	world	championships,	THE	
GUARDIAN	(July	30,	2019,	2:31	PM),	https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/jul/30/caster-se-
menya-blocked-defending-800-metres-title-athletics-world-championships;	 see	 also	 Geneva	 Ab-
dul,	This	Intersex	Runner	Had	Surgery	to	Compete.	It	Has	Not	Gone	Well.,	N.Y.	TIMES,	https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/12/16/sports/intersex-runner-surgery-track-and-field.html	 (last	 updated	 Dec.	
17,	2019);	see	also	Brad	Townsend,	Flashback:	Transgender	wrestler	Mack	Beggs	finishes	high	school	
career	with	another	UIL	 state	 title	amid	boos,	 criticism	and	questions,	THE	DALLAS	MORNING	NEWS	
(June	1	2,	2018)	,		https://www.dallasnews.com/high-school-sports/2018/06/13/flashback-
transgender-wrestler-mack-beggs-finishes-high-school-career-with-another-uil-state-title-amid-
boos-criticism-and-questions/.		
25 See	 generally	 Arthur	 Langer,	 Is	 Your	 Dress	 Code	 Discriminatory?,	 TLNT	 (May	 31,	 2019),	
https://www.tlnt.com/is-your-dress-code-discriminatory/.	
26 See	id.		
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To	reduce	judgment	and	discrimination	in	the	workplace	and	the	re-
sulting	harm	to	non-binary	and	gender	non-conforming	individuals,	le-
gal	employers	should	promulgate	and	enforce	dress	codes	without	ref-
erence	to	gender.		Just	as	gender	is	not	binary,	employer-promulgated	
and	-enforced	dress	codes	likewise	should	not	be	binary.		Unfortunately,	
although	the	law	could	be	read	to	ensure	that	employers	take	this	step,	
so	far	judicial	interpretation	has	avoided	that	result.			
III. THE	TITLE	VII	BLIND	SPOT:27		THE	CONFOUNDING	LEGALITY	OF	GENDER-
DIFFERENTIATED28	DRESS	CODES—AND	THE	HARMS	THEY	CAUSE	
A. Judicial	Interpretation	of	Title	VII	Permits	Gender-
Differentiated	Dress	Codes	
Title	VII	of	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1964	prohibits	employment	prac-
tices	 that	discriminate	on	 the	basis	of	 race,	 color,	 religion,	 sex,	or	na-
tional	origin:	
It	shall	be	an	unlawful	employment	practice	for	an	employer—	
	 	 	 (1)	to	fail	or	refuse	to	hire	or	to	discharge	any	individual,	or	oth-
erwise	to	discriminate	against	any	individual	with	respect	to	his	
compensation,	 terms,	 conditions,	 or	 privileges	 of	 employment,	
because	of	such	individual’s	race,	color,	religion,	sex,	or	national	
origin;	or	
	 	 	 (2)	to	limit,	segregate,	or	classify	his	employees	or	applicants	for	
	
27 See	 Jennifer	 L.	 Levi,	Misapplying	 Equality	 Theories:	 Dress	 Codes	 at	Work,	 19	 YALE	 J.	L.	&	
FEMINISM	353,	353	(2008).	
28 Dress	code	jurisprudence	and	scholarship	often	refer	to	gendered	dress	codes	as	“sex-dif-
ferentiated.”		This	is	consistent	with	the	language	of	Title	VII,	which	prohibits	discrimination	on	the	
basis	of	sex—not	gender	or	gender	identity.	 	However,	as	discussed	above,	supra	note	5,	an	em-
ployer	that	prohibits	or	discourages	a	male	employee	from	wearing	skirts	or	dresses	to	the	office—
or	that	penalizes	him	for	doing	so—makes	that	decision	based	not	on	the	employee’s	XY	sex	chro-
mosomes	but	rather	on	 the	employee’s	expressed	and	perceived	male	gender.	 	Therefore,	 in	an	
effort	to	be	precise	and	consistent,	this	essay	uses	the	word	gender,	even	though	that	word	may—
unfortunately—undermine	 the	 strength	 of	 a	 legal	 claim	 that	 an	 employer’s	 professional	 attire	
standards	amount	to	unlawful	discrimination.		For	further	discussion	of	this	issue,	see	Weinberg,	
supra	note	4	at	1–2,	writing:	“U[sing	the	words	sex],	gender,	sexual	orientation,	and	gender	identity	
interchangeably	may	seem	innocuous,	but	the	disaggregation	and	conflation	of	these	different	cat-
egories	has	permitted	courts	to	either	extend	or	give	a	more	preclusive	effect	to	sex	discrimination	
under	[Title	VII].	.	.	.	Although	sex	is	often	the	term	used	in	federal	civil	rights	statutes,	such	as	in	
Title	VII,	society’s	understanding	of	gender	and	sexuality	is	much	different	now	than	it	was	when	
many	such	laws	were	passed.	.	.	.	Because	gender	refers	to	the	physical	appearance	and	mannerisms	
of	an	individual,	many	scholars	agree	that	this	should	be	the	focal	point	of	inquiry	in	cases	involving	
‘sex.’”	
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employment	in	any	way	which	would	deprive	or	tend	to	deprive	
any	 individual	 of	 employment	 opportunities	 or	 otherwise	ad-
versely	affect	his	status	as	an	employee,	because	of	such	individ-
ual’s	race,	color,	religion,	sex,	or	national	origin.29	
Employer	dress	code	and	grooming	policies	have	been	 interpreted	as	
conditions	of	employment	and,	therefore,	must	comply	with	Title	VII	re-
quirements.30	A	question	regarding	Title	VII	 compliance	 is	whether	a	
challenged	dress	and	grooming	policy	has	a	 “legitimate	business	pur-
pose.”31	However,	a	policy	with	a	legitimate	business	purpose	may	nev-
ertheless	violate	Title	VII	if	it	(1)	places	an	unequal	burden	on	the	plain-
tiff’s	sex	or	(2)	is	“motivated	by	sex	stereotyping.”32	
In	Price	Waterhouse	v.	Hopkins,	the	Supreme	Court	identified	certain	
forms	of	 sex	stereotyping	as	 impermissible	under	Title	VII.33	Plaintiff	
Ann	Hopkins	had	alleged	that	her	employer,	Price	Waterhouse,	discrim-
inated	against	her	on	the	basis	of	sex	when	it	rejected	her	for	partner-
ship.34	Partners	in	Hopkins’s	office	had	recommended	her	candidacy	for	
partnership,	citing	her	strong	work	efforts	in	securing	a	$25	million	con-
tract	 for	Price	Waterhouse;	had	called	her	performance	“outstanding”	
and	“virtually	at	the	partner	level”;	and	had	described	her	as	“an	out-
standing	professional”	with	“strong	character,	independence,	and	integ-
rity.”35	But	both	supporters	and	opponents	of	Hopkins’s	candidacy	for	
partnership	expressed	that	Hopkins	was	“sometimes	overly	aggressive,	
unduly	harsh,	difficult	to	work	with	and	impatient	with	staff.”36	
In	addition,	Hopkins’s	colleagues	described	her	as	“macho,”	suggested	
that	she	“overcompensated	for	being	a	woman,”	said	she	should	“take	a	
course	at	charm	school,”	and	criticized	her	use	of	profanity,	with	one	
partner	acknowledging	that	those	objections	were	to	“a	lady	using	foul	
language.”37	Further,	when	Hopkins	learned	that	Price	Waterhouse	was	
deferring	her	reconsideration	for	partnership	until	the	following	year,	
	
29 42	U.S.C.	§	2000e-2	(1964)	(emphasis	added).	
30 See	generally	Ashlee	Johnson,	From	Jespersen	to	Jenner:	Exploring	Grooming	Policy	Standards	
in	The	Age	of	Gender	Nonconformity,	7	WAKE	FOREST	J.	OF	L.	&	POL’Y	607,	611–12	(2017).	
31 See	Michelle	Y.	DiMaria,	The	Fine	Line	Employers	Walk:	Is	It	a	Justified	Business	Practice,	or	
Discrimination?,	6	LAB.&	EMP.	L.	F.	1,	2	(2016).	
32 See	Jespersen	v.	Harrah’s	Operating	Co.,	Inc.,	444	F.3d	1104,	1106	(2006)	(en	banc).	
33 See	Price	Waterhouse	v.	Hopkins,	490	U.S.	228,	251,	258	(1989).	
34 See	id.	at	231–32.	
35 See	id.	at	233–34.	
36 See	id.	at	235	(internal	quotation	marks	omitted).	
37 Id.	
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she	was	 told	 that	 she	 should	 “walk	more	 femininely,	 talk	more	 femi-
ninely,	dress	more	femininely,	wear	make-up,	have	her	hair	styled,	and	
wear	jewelry”	to	improve	her	chances.38	
The	Court	held	that	Price	Waterhouse’s	employment	actions	consti-
tuted	impermissible	sex	stereotyping	under	Title	VII.39	Specifically,	the	
Court	held	that	employers	cannot	consider	an	individual’s	failure	to	con-
form	to	sex-based	stereotypes	when	making	employment	decisions.40	
Writing	for	the	plurality,	Justice	Brennan	warned	that	actions	that	draw	
upon	and	perpetuate	sex	stereotypes	violate	Title	VII’s	broad	prohibi-
tion	of	sex	discrimination:	
	 	 	 In	the	specific	context	of	sex	stereotyping,	an	employer	who	acts	
on	the	basis	of	a	belief	that	a	woman	cannot	be	aggressive,	or	
that	she	must	not	be,	has	acted	on	the	basis	of	gender.	.	.	.	[W]e	
are	beyond	the	day	when	an	employer	could	evaluate	employees	
by	assuming	or	insisting	that	they	matched	the	stereotype	asso-
ciated	with	 their	 group,	 for	 “[i]n	 forbidding	employers	 to	dis-
criminate	against	individuals	because	of	their	sex,	Congress	in-
tended	to	strike	at	the	entire	spectrum	of	disparate	treatment	of	
men	and	women	resulting	from	sex	stereotypes.”41	
Despite	Justice	Brennan’s	expansive	condemnation	of	employers’	insist-
ence	 on	 conformity	 to	 sex	 stereotypes,	 gender-differentiated	 dress	
codes—which	are	by	definition	an	employer’s	insistence	on	conformity	
to	sex	stereotypes—have	been	consistently	upheld	by	lower	courts	as	
legal	and	constitutional.42	
Specifically,	lower	courts	have	repeatedly	held	that	gender-differen-
tiated	dress	or	grooming	standards	alone	are	insufficient	to	establish	a	
prima	facie	case	of	sex	discrimination	under	Title	VII.43	Rather,	to	pre-
vail,	a	plaintiff	must	establish	that	the	policy	either	(1)	places	“unequal	
burdens”	on	the	plaintiff	because	of	her	gender	or	(2)	was	motivated	by	
	
38 Id.	
39 See	id.	at	251.	
40 See	id.	at	251–52.	
41 See	id.	at	250–51.	
42 See,	e.g.,	Harper	v.	Blockbuster	Entm’t	Corp.,	139	F.3d	1385,	1386	(11th	Cir.	1998)	(dismiss-
ing	challenge	to	policy	prohibiting	men	from	having	long	hair);	see	also	Tavora	v.	N.Y.	Mercantile	
Exch.,	101	F.3d	907	 (2d	Cir.	1996)	 (upholding	policy	 requiring	 that	male	employees	have	short	
hair);	see	also	Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1104.	
43 See,	e.g.,	Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1104;	see	also	Frank	v.	United	Airlines,	Inc.,	216	F.3d	845,	854–
55	(9th	Cir.	2000).	
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impermissible	sex	stereotyping.44	Both	routes	have	proven	difficult	for	
plaintiffs.	
For	example,	in	Jespersen	v.	Harrah’s	Operating	Co.,	the	Ninth	Circuit	
stated	that	the	courts	“have	long	recognized	that	companies	may	differ-
entiate	 between	men	 and	women	 in	 appearance	 and	 grooming	 poli-
cies.”45	 In	 Jespersen,	 a	 casino’s	 gender-differentiated	 “Personal	 Best”	
grooming	 policy	 required	 that	 female	 employees	 wear	 their	 hair	
“teased,	curled,	or	styled,”	wear	stockings	and	colored	nail	polish,46	and	
apply	specific	makeup	types	as	directed	by	casino-hired	“image	consult-
ants.”47	The	plaintiff,	Darlene	Jespersen,	experienced	extreme	discom-
fort	wearing	makeup	and	 claimed	 that	being	 required	 to	do	 so	nega-
tively	affected	her	job	performance.48	
Yet	the	court	held	that	Jespersen	did	not	have	a	cognizable	claim	un-
der	Title	VII.49	The	court	reaffirmed	its	previous	holding	that,	to	estab-
lish	a	prima	facie	case	of	sex	discrimination	under	Title	VII,	a	plaintiff	
must	prove	that	the	challenged	policy	either	“creates	an	‘unequal	bur-
den’	for	the	plaintiff’s	gender”50	or	was	motivated	by	sex	stereotyping.51	
Based	on	that	rule,	the	court	held	that	Jespersen	had	not	established	a	
prima	facie	claim	under	either	theory.52	
First,	 the	 court	 concluded	 that	 the	 casino’s	 grooming	policies	were	
similarly	burdensome	for	both	male	and	female	employees.53	The	court	
reasoned	that	both	male	and	female	employees	were	required	to	keep	
trimmed	nails	and	to	wear	similar	uniforms,	and	that	men	were	prohib-
ited	 from	wearing	makeup,	 applying	 nail	 polish,	 or	 having	 long	 hair,	
while	women	were	required	to	do	all	those	things.54	The	court	further	
reasoned	 that	 Jespersen	had	not	provided	 sufficient	 evidence	 that	 “it	
costs	more	money	and	takes	more	time	for	a	woman	to	comply	with	the	
makeup	 requirement	 than	 it	 takes	 for	 a	 man	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
	
44 See	Mary	A.	Case,	Legal	Protections	For	The	“Personal	Best”	Of	Each	Employee:	Title	VII’s	Pro-
hibition	On	 Sex	Discrimination,	 The	 Legacy	Of	 Price	Waterhouse	 v.	 Hopkins,	 And	 The	 Prospect	 Of	
ENDA,	66	STAN.	L.	REV.	1333,	1346-47	(2014).	
45 Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1110.	
46 See	id.	at	1107.	
47 See	id.	at	1114.	
48 See	id.	at	1108.	
49 See	id.	at	1112.	
50 See	id.	at	1110.	
51 See	id.	at	1111.	
52 See	id.	at	1106.	
53 See	id.	at	1109.	
54 See	id.	at	1107.	
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requirement	that	he	keep	his	hair	short.”55	Therefore,	refusing	to	take	
judicial	notice	of	facts	Jespersen	had	failed	to	introduce	into	evidence,	
the	court	concluded	that	Jespersen	had	not	established	that	the	casino’s	
policy	imposed	an	unequal	burden	on	female	employees.56	
Second,	in	the	court’s	view,	Jespersen	had	not	proven	that	the	casino	
had	 partaken	 in	 impermissible	 sex	 stereotyping.57	 The	 court	 distin-
guished	Jespersen’s	case	from	Hopkins’s	in	several	ways.58	It	reasoned	
that	Price	Waterhouse’s	stereotyping	placed	Hopkins	in	a	“double	bind,”	
discouraging	 her	 from	 acting	masculine	 even	 though	 acting	 that	way	
had	contributed	to	her	success;	in	contrast,	the	casino’s	stereotyping	did	
not	“objectively	inhibit	[Jespersen’s]	ability	to	do	the	job”—in	part	be-
cause	 Jespersen’s	 subjective,	 individual	 experience	 was	 insufficient	
proof.59	Further,	the	court	observed	that	where	Price	Waterhouse	had	
asked	Hopkins	to	hide	traits	that	were	considered	praiseworthy	in	men,	
the	casino	did	not	“single	out	Jespersen”;	rather,	it	applied	its	“Personal	
Best”	policy	 “to	all	of	 the	bartenders,	male	and	 female.”60	 Finally,	 the	
court	reasoned	that,	unlike	in	Price	Waterhouse,	no	evidence	in	Jesper-
sen’s	case	indicated	“that	the	policy	was	adopted	to	make	women	bar-
tenders	conform	to	a	commonly-accepted	stereotypical	image	of	what	
women	should	wear.”61	
The	Ninth	Circuit	went	on	to	distinguish	Jespersen’s	case	from	other	
sex	stereotyping	cases,	reasoning	that	the	casino’s	policy	was	not	“in-
tended	to	be	sexually	provocative,”	the	policy	did	not	“intend	to	stereo-
type	women	as	sex	objects,”62	and	Jespersen	had	not	sued	for	sexual	har-
assment.63	 Ultimately,	 the	 court	 reaffirmed64	 that	 while	 a	 Title	 VII	
	
55 See	id.	at	1110.	
56 See	id.	at	1110–11.	
57 See	id.	at	1111–12.	
58 See	generally,	Angela	Clements,	Sexual	Orientation,	Gender	Nonconformity,	and	Trait-Based	
Discrimination:	Cautionary	Tales	from	Title	VII	&	(and)	an	Argument	for	Inclusion,	24	BERKELEY	J.	OF	
GENDER,	L.	&	JUST.	166,	183	(2009).	
59 See	id.	
60 See	Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1111–12.	
61 See	id.	at	1112;	contra	Katie	Reineck,	Running	from	the	Gender	Police:	Reconceptualizing	Gen-
der	to	Ensure	Protection	for	Non-Binary	People,	24	MICH.	J.	GENDER	&	L.	265,	278–79	(2017)	(arguing	
that	the	Jespersen	court	“failed	to	recognize	that	stereotyping	can	be	based	on	implicit	biases	and	
does	not	require	the	employer	to	realize	that	it	is	asking	women	employees	to	adhere	to	a	gendered	
stereotype	when	it	determines,	for	example,	that	they	must	wear	makeup	to	look	professional.”)	
62 See	Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1112.			
63 See	id.	at	1111–13	(contrasting	against	Rene	v.	MGM	Grand	Hotel,	Inc.,	305	F.3d	1061,	1068–
69	(9th	Cir.	2002)	(en	banc);	Nichols	v.	Azteca	Restaurant	Enters.,	Inc.,	256	F.3d	864,	874	(9th	Cir.	
2001)).	
64 See	Case,	supra	note	44,	at	1358	(“The	Ninth	Circuit	claimed	it	‘took	this	sex	discrimination	
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challenge	to	a	dress	or	grooming	policy	could	be	successful	using	a	sex-
stereotyping	theory,	Jespersen	had	failed	to	establish	such	a	case.65	
B. Critiques	of	Gender-Differentiated	Dress	Code	Jurisprudence	
The	unequal	burden	and	sex	stereotyping	standards	reaffirmed	in	Jes-
persen	have	been	criticized	by	scholars	and	legal	practitioners	on	sev-
eral	grounds.		First,	critics	argue	that	dress	code	jurisprudence—known	
colloquially	as	the	“Title	VII	blind	spot”66—violates	the	plain	language	
and	early	interpretations	of	Title	VII.67	Even	though	courts	generally	an-
alyze	Title	VII	claims	“with	the	understanding	that	every	employee	or	
prospective	 employee	 must	 be	 treated	 without	 regard	 to	 protected	
traits,	such	as	race,	sex,	religion,	or	disability,”	when	analyzing	dress	or	
grooming	policies,	courts	allow	employees	to	be	treated	differently	with	
regard	to	their	sex	(or	gender).68	In	fact,	early	rulings	by	the	Equal	Em-
ployment	Opportunity	 Commission	 (EEOC)	 stated	 that	 “[t]o	maintain	
one	employment	standard	for	females	and	another	for	males	discrimi-
nates	because	of	 sex	 .	.	.	 and	 is	unlawful	unless	 the	employer	demon-
strates	the	applicability	of	the	narrow	[bona	fide	occupational	qualifica-
tion]	69	exception.”70	The	EEOC	eventually	“admitted	defeat”	after	courts	
consistently	 held	 that	 gender-differentiated	 dress	 and	 grooming	
	
case	en	banc	in	order	to	reaffirm	our	circuit	law	concerning	appearance	and	grooming	standards,	
and	to	clarify	our	evolving	law	of	sex	stereotyping	claims.’”	(quoting	Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1105)).	
65 See	Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1113.	
66 See	 Jennifer	 L.	 Levi,	Misapplying	 Equality	 Theories:	 Dress	 Codes	 at	Work,	 19	 YALE	 J.	L.	&	
FEMINISM	353,	356	(2008)	(“I	call	this	anomalous	jurisprudence—the	collection	of	cases	upholding	
different	standards	of	dress	for	men	and	women	in	the	workplace—the	‘Title	VII	blind	spot.’”)	
67 See	Case,	supra	note	44,	at	1354;	see	also	Case,	supra	note	5,	at	48–49	(“[O]ne	need	not	go	
beyond	the	plain	 language	of	[Title	VII]	to	find	explicit	protection	for	[the]	 ‘male	employee	who	
routinely	appeared	for	work	in	skirts	and	dresses	.	.	.	.’”);	see	also	Peter	B.	Bayer,	Mutable	Charac-
teristics	and	the	Definition	of	Discrimination	under	Title	VII,	20	U.C.	DAVIS	L.	REV.	769,	771	(1987)	
(“[T]he	courts	have	yet	to	fulfill	[Title	VII]’s	mandate.	 	 In	apparent	contradiction	of	the	statute’s	
plain	language,	the	courts	have	defined	certain	policies	as	nondiscriminatory	despite	the	fact	that	
the	policies	make	blatant	distinctions	on	the	basis	of	sex,	race,	and	national	origin	.	.	.	.”);	see	also	
Jennifer	L.	Levi,	Clothes	Don’t	Make	the	Man	(or	Woman),	But	Gender	Identity	Might,	15	COLUM.	J.	
GENDER	&	L.	90,	97	(2006)	(writing	that	in	Jespersen	the	Ninth	Circuit	turned	Title	VII	on	its	head	
and	departed	from	well-established	law	when	it	interpreted	Title	VII’s	precedent	to	mean	that	Jes-
persen	could	not	prevail	unless	her	case	demonstrated	that	all	women	are	burdened,	not	just	those	
who,	like	her,	are	offended	and	harmed	by	having	to	wear	makeup.)	
68 See	Johnson,	supra	note	30,	at	614.	
69 The	bona	fide	occupational	exception	allows	an	employer	to	discriminate	against	an	indi-
vidual	on	the	basis	of	certain	protected	characteristics	“in	those	certain	instances	where	religion,	
sex,	or	national	origin	is	a	bona	fide	occupational	qualification	reasonably	necessary	to	the	normal	
operation	of	that	particular	business	or	enterprise.”	See	42	U.S.C.	§	2000e-2(e).	
70 See	Case,	supra	note	44,	at	1354.	
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policies	are,	alone,	insufficient	to	sustain	a	claim	under	Title	VII.71	But	
its	original	stance	was	consistent	with	the	plain	language	of	Title	VII.72	
Second,	critics	argue	that	in	addition	to	violating	Title	VII’s	plain	lan-
guage,	dress	code	jurisprudence	subverts	Title	VII’s	purpose73—and	the	
purpose	 of	 anti-discrimination	 law	 generally.74	 The	 reasoning	 em-
ployed	by	courts	in	permitting	gender-differentiated	dress	and	groom-
ing	policies	limits	the	ability	of	marginalized	groups	to	achieve	equal	op-
portunity75—a	result	antithetical	to	the	purpose	of	anti-discrimination	
laws.76	 Indeed,	 by	 condoning	 “even-handed”	 discrimination,77	 dress	
code	jurisprudence	perpetuates	the	kind	of	discrimination	that	Title	VII	
was	implemented	to	prevent.78	
Third,	critics	argue	that	Jespersen	and	other	decisions	like	it	directly	
betray	 Price	 Waterhouse’s	 holding	 and	 reasoning.79	 Though	
	
71 See	id.	at	1355.		Though	the	EEOC	“admitted	defeat,”	it	“held	to	its	longstanding	view	that	
‘absent	a	showing	of	a	business	necessity,	different	grooming	standards	for	men	and	women	con-
stitute	sex	discrimination	under	Title	VII’”	Id.	
72 See	id.	at	1361.	
73 See	Bayer,	supra	note	67,	at	772–73	(arguing	that	“all	employment	decisions,	criteria,	terms,	
conditions,	and	opportunities	that	are	premised	on	or	implicate	race,	color,	religion,	sex	or	national	
origin	are	discriminatory”	in	light	of	Title	VII’s	“overall	goal”:	“evaluating	individuals	based	on	their	
qualifications	rather	than	upon	group	stereotypes.”).	
74 See	Clements,	supra	note	58,	at	171,	198	(arguing	that	the	stigmatization	arising	from	the	
“trait	discrimination”—discrimination	on	the	basis	of	“mutable	traits”	rather	than	immutable	traits	
or	traits	“tied	to	a	fundamental	right”—condoned	in	dress	code	jurisprudence	“frustrates	the	goal	
of	antidiscrimination	law:	to	achieve	social	equality	for	historically	disenfranchised	groups”).	
75 See	id.	at	179.	
76 See	id.	at	171,	198.	
77 See	Bayer,	supra	note	67,	at	862	(discussing	Gerdom	v.	Continental	Airlines,	Inc.,	692	F.2d	602	
(9th	Cir.	1982)	(en	banc),	cert.	dismissed,	460	U.S.	(1983)	(reasoning	that	“grooming	rules	.	.	.	which	
do	not	significantly	deprive	either	sex	of	employment	opportunities[]	and	which	are	even-handedly	
applied	 to	employees	of	both	sexes”	are	permissible)	(emphasis	added));	see	also	 Jespersen,	444	
F.3d	at	1110	(“where,	as	here,	such	[grooming	and	appearance]	policies	are	reasonable	and	are	
imposed	in	an	evenhanded	manner	on	all	employees,	slight	differences	in	the	appearance	require-
ments	for	males	and	females	have	only	a	negligible	effect	on	employment	opportunities.”)	(empha-
sis	added)	(internal	quotations	omitted)	(quoting	Knott	v.	Mo.	Pac.	Ra.	Co.,	527	F.2d	1249,	1252	(8th	
Cir.	1975)).	
78 See	Case,	supra	note	5,	at	46,	81	(writing	that	“under	a	disparate	impact	analysis,	requiring	
such	gendered	characteristics	(even	if	evenhandedly	from	both	sexes)	in	the	absence	of	business	
necessity	is	[]	a	violation	of	Title	VII	.	.	.”	and	that	“if	courts	knock	out	objective	standards	on	dis-
parate	impact	analysis	but	preclude	employees	from	challenging	subjective	ones,	far	from	elimi-
nating	discrimination,	the	courts	have	rather	expanded	even	further	the	scope	of	covert	discrimi-
nation	under	the	hypocritical	face	of	neutral	standards”);	see	cf.	Bayer,	supra	note	67,	at	862–63	
(arguing	that	“a	male-only	hair	length	rule	is	not	‘evenhanded’	[because	i]t	places	a	stereotypical	
requisite	on	men	.	.	.	that	is	not	imposed	on	women”).		
79 See	Case,	supra	note	44,	at	1357–58	(explaining	that	the	Jespersen	holding	did	not	align	with	
the	Hopkins	holding	of	“interpreting	a	clear	statutory	text	prohibiting	employer-mandated	distinc-
tions	between	the	sexes”	even	though	Jespersen	had	stark	factual	similarities	to	Hopkins);	see	also	
Case,	supra	note	5,	at	49	(explaining	that	notwithstanding	Hopkins’s	finding	of	impermissible	sex	
discrimination	by	employers	against	women	based	on	appearance,	“discrimination	against	male	
job	 applicants	 who	 appear	 ‘effeminate’	 is	 generally	 lawful,	 as	 is	 employment	 against	 cross-
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disagreement	exists	as	to	the	“clear”	or	“main”	holding	of	Price	Water-
house,80	 some	 critics	 remain	 adamant	 that	 its	 holding	 and	 reasoning	
were	 unmistakable.81	 Specifically,	 they	 argue	 that	Price	Waterhouse’s	
holding	“that	it	constitutes	impermissible	sex	stereotyping	to	suggest	to	
a	female	employee	that	she	‘dress	more	femininely,	wear	makeup,	have	
her	hair	styled,	and	wear	 jewelry’	should	make	clear	 that	sex-specific	
grooming	standards	violate	Title	VII.”82	If	Price	Waterhouse	“stand[s]	for	
the	proposition	that	any	sex	stereotyping	in	the	workplace	is	impermis-
sible	and	violative	of	Title	VII,”83	dress	code	jurisprudence—which	al-
lows	employers	to	force	employees	to	conform	to	sex-based	stereotypes	
regarding	attire—clearly	betrays	Price	Waterhouse.	
Finally,	the	logic	employed	by	courts	in	upholding	gender-differenti-
ated	dress	and	grooming	policies	essentially	renders	this	 form	of	dis-
crimination	 immune	 from	 challenge,	 except	 under	 extreme	 circum-
stances.84	 Courts	 adopting	an	 interpretation	of	Price	Waterhouse	 that	
deems	sex	stereotyping	 impermissible	 “only	 insofar	as	 it	has	a	perni-
cious	 effect	 on	 the	 advancement	 of	 women	 in	 the	 workplace”85	 will	
	
dressers”).			
80 See	Clements,	supra	note	58,	at	179	(referencing	other	commentators’	observation	that	“it	
is	not	clear	that	the	Court’s	holding	established	that	sex	stereotyping	per	se	violates	Title	VII,”	and	
noting	that	“the	Court’s	discussion	of	sex	stereotyping	was	not	central	to	the	key	holding	of	the	case,	
which	was	to	resolve	how	a	plaintiff	must	prove	a	‘mixed-motive’	discrimination	case.	.	.	 .”)	(em-
phasis	added);	see	also	Amy	McCrea,	Note,	UNDER	THE	TRANSGENDER	UMBRELLA:	 IMPROVING	
ENDA’S	PROTECTIONS,	15	GEO.	J.	GENDER	&	L.	543,	551	(writing	that	“[a]rguably,	a	natural	implica-
tion	of	the	Supreme	Court’s	prohibition	on	sex	stereotyping	in	Price	Waterhouse	would	be	that	em-
ployers	may	not	have	dress	or	grooming	standards	requiring	male	and	female	employees	to	dress	
or	groom	themselves	in	a	particular	and	different	ways”	but	that	“federal	courts	may	not	share	this	
interpretation”).	
81 See	Case,	supra	note	44,	at	1357	(calling	Price	Waterhouse	“a	clear	holding	interpreting	a	
clear	statutory	text	prohibiting	employer-mandated	distinctions	between	the	sexes.”).	
82 Mary	A.	Case,	Disaggregating	Gender	from	Sex	and	Sexual	Orientation:	The	Effeminate	Man	in	
the	Law	and	Feminist	Jurisprudence,	105	YALE	L.	J.	1,	49	(1995).	
83 Levi,	supra	note	66,	at	378	(acknowledging	two	main	interpretations	of	Price	Waterhouse:	
(1)	“that	any	sex	stereotyping	in	the	workplace	is	impermissible,”	and	(2)	“that	sex	stereotyping	is	
impermissible	only	insofar	as	it	has	a	pernicious	effect	on	the	advancement	of	women	in	the	work-
place.”).	
84 See	 id.	 at	 389	 (writing	 that	 “[a]s	 long	 as	 courts	 rely	 exclusively	 on	 group-based	 equality	
claims	 rooted	 in	 second	 generation	 anti-subordination	 analysis,	 […]	 dress	 code	 challenges	will	
likely	fail.”);	see	also	Clements,	supra	note	58	at	179	(describing	existing	scholarship’s	argument	
that	“the	assimilationist	themes	running	through	[dress	code	jurisprudence	and	courts’	reasoning]	
severely	limits	the	ability	of	subordinated	groups	to	achieve	equal	opportunity	in	the	workplace”);	
see	also	McCrea,	supra	note	80,	at	552	(arguing	that	the	Jespersen	court’s	blanket	statement	that	
“Harrah’s	grooming	standards	do	not	require	Jespersen	to	conform	to	a	stereotypical	image	that	
would	objectively	impede	her	ability	to	perform	her	job	requirements	as	a	bartender[,]”	particu-
larly	without	any	 further	explanation,	“provided	 little	guidance	to	plaintiffs	attacking	a	dress	or	
grooming	policy	.	.	.”).	
85 Levi,	supra	note	66,	at	378.	
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require	“not	simply	a	showing	of	sex	stereotyping	(or	differentiation	be-
tween	men	and	women)	but	 subordination	as	well.”86	And,	 “[b]ecause	
most	women	are	gender	conforming,	such	a	showing	is	difficult,	at	best,	
to	make.”87	
Jespersen	illustrates	another	type	of	hurdle	that	dress	code	challeng-
ers	have	faced:	failing	to	prove	what	should	be	self-evident.		The	Jesper-
sen	court’s	observation	that	the	plaintiff	had	not	introduced	sufficient	
evidence	“that	the	policy	was	adopted	to	make	women	bartenders	con-
form	to	a	commonly-accepted	stereotypic	image	of	what	women	should	
wear”	falls	flat	because	the	policy	plainly	did	precisely	that:	by	forcing	
female	bartenders	to	apply	particular	makeup,	wear	colored	nail	polish,	
and	 tease,	 curl,	 or	 style	 their	 hair,	 the	 “Personal	 Best”	 policy	 forced	
women	employees	to	perform	their	gender	in	a	stereotypical	way—and	
penalized	them	when	they	deviated	from	a	gender	stereotype.88	Thus,	
the	plaintiff	lost	because	she	failed	to	prove	something	obvious—a	logi-
cal	corollary	of	what	she	did	prove.89	
Relatedly,	 the	 Jespersen	 court’s	 statement	 that	no	evidence	showed	
that	 female	 bartenders	must	 invest	more	 time	 and	money	 than	male	
bartenders	to	comply	with	the	policy	has	been	criticized,	 including	 in	
one	Jespersen	dissent:	
	 	 	 Every	[Harrah’s]	requirement	that	forces	men	to	spend	time	or	
money	on	 their	 appearance	has	 a	 corresponding	 requirement	
that	is	as,	or	more,	burdensome	for	women:	short	hair	v.	“teased,	
curled,	 or	 styled”	 hair;	 clean	 trimmed	nails	 v.	 nail	 length	 and	
color	 requirements.	.	.	.	 	 The	 requirement	 that	 women	 spend	
more	time	and	money	applying	full	facial	makeup	has	no	corre-
sponding	 requirement	 for	 men,	 making	 the	 “overall	 policy”	
more	burdensome	for	the	former	than	the	latter.	.	.	.			
	 	 	 It	is	true	that	Jespersen	failed	to	present	evidence	about	what	it	
costs	 to	buy	makeup	and	how	 long	 it	 takes	 to	 apply	 it.	But	 is	
	
86 Id.	at	378–79.		
87 Id.	at	379.	
88 See	 Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1112;	 id.	at	1114	(Pregerson,	 J.,	dissenting)	(“I	believe	that	 the	
‘Personal	Best’	program	was	part	of	a	policy	motivated	by	sex	stereotyping	and	that	Jespersen’s	
termination	for	failing	to	comply	with	the	program’s	requirements	was	‘because	of’	her	sex.”).	
89 See	Reineck,	supra	note	61,	at	296	(referring	to	the	Jespersen	court’s	reasoning	as	an	“un-
willingness	to	use	common	sense”);	see	also	McCrea,	supra	note	80,	at	551	(writing	that	“[i]t	seems	
obvious	 that	 a	 policy	 requiring	women	 to	wear	makeup	 and	 forbidding	men	 to	 do	 the	 same	 is	
rooted	in	sex	stereotypes.”).	
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there	any	doubt	that	putting	on	makeup	costs	money	and	takes	
time?	.	.	.		
	 	 	 Women’s	faces,	just	like	those	of	men,	can	be	perfectly	present-
able	without	makeup.	.	.	.	I	see	no	justification	for	forcing	them	
to	 conform	 to	Harrah’s	quaint	notion	of	what	a	 “real	woman”	
looks	like.90	
One	final,	foundational	critique	is	also	worth	raising:	contrary	to	the	
reasoning	within	dress	code	jurisprudence,	gender-differentiated	dress	
codes—particularly	 in	the	 legal	profession—do	not	serve	a	 legitimate	
business	purpose.		Legitimate	business	purposes	for	dress	or	grooming	
policies	include	safety	or	hygiene	considerations;	customer	preference,	
“so	long	as	catering	to	this	preference	does	not	have	a	discriminatory	
impact;”91	and	the	need	to	operate	efficiently	and	productively,	or	prof-
itably.92	Legal	employers,	like	all	employers,	have	an	interest	in	prom-
ulgating	and	enforcing	dress	and	grooming	policies	to	ensure	hygiene,	
cater	to	non-discriminatory	client	preference,	and	foster	a	professional	
atmosphere.93	However,	no	legitimate	business	purpose	justifies	mak-
ing	these	policies	gendered.94	To	be	blunt,	if	a	firm	finds	a	well-pressed,	
knee-length,	 tailored	dress	 on	 a	 female	 employee	 to	be	 acceptable,	 it	
should	find	a	similar	dress	on	any	employee	to	be	acceptable.	 	Reflex-
ively	replicating	antiquated	gender	stereotypes	is	not	a	legitimate	busi-
ness	purpose.	
Though	the	policies	challenged	in	Jespersen	and	similar	cases	may	lack	
legitimate	justification,	they	do	have	an	explanation:	gender	discrimina-
tion.		They	also	have	harmful	effects.	
C. The	Damaging	Effects	of	Dress	Code	Jurisprudence95	
Dress	 code	 jurisprudence’s	 greatest	 flaw	 may	 be	 its	 continued	
	
90 See	Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1117–18	(Kozinksi,	J.,	dissenting).	
91 See	HR	SERIES	POLICIES	AND	PRACTICES	(Jan.	2020).		
92 See	id;	Mark	R.	Bandsuch,	Ten	Troubles	with	Title	VII	and	Trait	Discrimination	Plus	One	Simple	
Solution	(A	Totality	of	the	Circumstances	Framework),	37	CAP.	U.	L.	REV.	965,	1087	(2009).	
93 See	Bandsuch,	supra	note	92,	at	1087.	
94 See	generally	id.	at	1082–83.	
95 This	essay	explores	the	harms	that	dress	code	jurisprudence	inflicts	upon	non-binary	and	
gender	non-conforming	individuals.		But	dress	code	jurisprudence—and	dress	codes	generally—
also	perpetuate	judgment	and	discrimination	against	other	minority	groups.	 	Though	race	is	not	
the	focus	of	this	essay,	complex	intersectionality	issues	should,	at	a	minimum,	be	acknowledged	in	
any	discussion	of	dress	codes	and	the	harms	they	create.		See	Janet	Ainsworth,	What’s	Wrong	with	
Pink	Pearls	and	Cornrow	Braids?:	Employee	Dress	Codes	and	the	Semiotic	Performance	of	Race	and	
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insistence	that	plaintiffs	show	group-based	harm	to	sustain	a	claim	un-
der	Title	VII.96	As	one	critic	has	pointed	out,	“[t]he	harm	caused	by	.	.	.	
dress	 codes	 is	 perceived	 exclusively	 as	 an	 individualized	 harm	 not	
shared	by	other	members	of	the	affected	class.”97	“However,	Title	VII,	
the	law	that	serves	as	the	doctrinal	basis	of	these	claims	does	not	require	
a	showing	of	group	harm.”98	By	requiring	proof	of	group,	not	individual,	
harm	under	the	unequal	burdens	analysis,99	dress	code	jurisprudence	
has	become	a	disingenuous	attempt	to	address	discrimination:	“[i]t	has	
permitted	employers	to	impose	sex-based	workplace	policies	that	have	
a	pernicious	effect	on	people	whose	gender	identity	does	not	fit	within	
traditional	norms.”100	Thus,	by	declining	to	remedy—or	often,	even	rec-
ognize—the	 individual	 harms	 caused	 by	 gender-differentiated	 dress	
codes,	courts	have	allowed	those	policies	and	harms	to	persist.	
Gender-differentiated	dress	codes	effectively	force	gender	non-con-
forming	individuals	to	perform	an	inauthentic	identity.101	Gender	iden-
tity	is	central	to	a	person’s	core—”perva[sive	in]	one’s	entire	concept	of	
one’s	 place	 in	 life.”102	 In	 several	 cases	 challenging	 dress	 codes,	
transgender	plaintiffs	“have	successfully	demonstrated	the	[individual	
harm]	of	having	to	express	a	gender	inconsistent	with	their	internalized	
sense	of	who	they	are	as	male	or	female,”	neither,	or	both.103	The	inau-
thenticity	 required	 of	 gender	 non-conforming	 individuals	 forced	 to	
comply	with	sex-differentiated	dress	codes	“creates	a	culture	of	coerced	
assimilation.”104	And,	by	requiring	a	showing	of	a	group	subordinating	
effect,	courts	have	failed	to	“recognize	that	 ‘sometimes	assimilation	is	
not	an	escape	from	discrimination,	but	precisely	its	effect.’”105	
	
Gender	in	the	Workplace,	in	LAW,	CULTURE	AND	VISUAL	STUDIES	(Anne	Wagner	&	Richard	K.	Sherwin,	
eds.,	2014).	
96 See	 Levi,	 supra	 note	66,	 at	356.	 	For	example,	 the	 “unequal	burdens”	 analysis	 requires	 a	
plaintiff	to	show	an	“unequal	burden	on	the	plaintiff’s	[gender]”—not	just	an	unequal	burden	on	
the	plaintiff	because	of	her	sex.	 	 Jespersen,	444	F.3d	at	1106.	This	creates	a	required	showing	of	
group	(not	just	individual)	harm.		See	id.	at	1109.	
97 See	Levi,	supra	note	66,	at	357.	
98 See	id.	
99 See	Johnson,	supra	note	30,	at	624	(“[W]hile	courts	have	expanded	the	Price	Waterhouse	sex	
stereotyping	standard,	the	unequal	burdens	standard	has	barely	evolved,	and	challenges	under	that	
standard	are	unlikely	to	succeed	where	the	majority	of	employees	suffer	no	burden	in	complying	
with	sex-specific	grooming	policies	based	on	gender	norms.”).	
100 See	Levi,	supra	note	66,	at	364.	
101 See	id.	at	367.	
102 See	id.	at	365	(quoting	M.T.	v.	J.T.,	A.2d	204,	205	(N.J.	Super.	Ct.	App.	Div.,	1976).	
103 See	id.	at	366.	
104 Bandsuch,	supra	note	92,	at	983.	
105 See	id.	(quoting	Ritu	Mahajan,	The	Naked	Truth:	Appearance	Discrimination,	Employment	
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The	“coerced	assimilation”	effected	by	dress	code	jurisprudence	and	
gender-differentiated	dress	codes	 interferes	with	personal	autonomy,	
privacy,	 and	 identity.106	 It	 reinforces	 stigmatization	 and	 subordina-
tion.107	 And	 it	 prevents	 gender	 non-conforming	 individuals	 from	
achieving	truly	equal	opportunity	in	the	workplace108.	This	causes	con-
crete	economic	harm.109	In	effect,	dress	code	jurisprudence’s	interpre-
tation	of	Title	VII	is	itself	“a	source	of	discriminatory	injury	to	the	very	
groups	it	was	created	to	protect.”110	
IV. PROMULGATING	AND	ENFORCING	DRESS	CODES	WITHOUT	REFERENCE	TO	
GENDER:	A	STRATEGIC	CHOICE	CONSISTENT	WITH	ETHICAL	DUTIES,	
CULTURAL	EVOLUTION,	AND	MARKET	FORCES	
On	a	practical	level,	the	“Title	VII	blind	spot”	eliminates	one	possible	
route	to	reform	in	the	legal	profession:	legal	employers	will	not	create	
genderless	 dress	 standards	 because	marginalized	 employees	 bravely	
raise	 their	voices,	 file	discrimination	claims,	 and	secure	 court	orders.		
Rather,	 legal	employers	will	create	genderless	standards,	and	enforce	
them	in	a	gender-neutral	manner,	only	when	those	employers	realize	
that	doing	so	is	consistent	with	their	ethical	obligations	and	advances	
their	business	interests.	
Although	gendered	dress	codes	may	be	legal,	they	may	nevertheless	
be	unethical.		In	2016,	the	ABA	passed	a	new	model	rule	of	professional	
responsibility	that,	if	adopted	by	a	state,	would	subject	a	lawyer	to	dis-
cipline	for	harassing	or	discriminatory	conduct:	
	 	 	 	It	is	professional	misconduct	for	a	lawyer	to:	.	.	.	
	 	 	 (g)	 engage	 in	 conduct	 that	 the	 lawyer	 knows	 or	 reasonably	
should	 know	 is	 harassment	 or	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
race,	sex,	religion,	national	origin,	ethnicity,	disability,	age,	sex-
ual	orientation,	gender	identity,	marital	status	or	socioeconomic	
status	in	conduct	related	to	the	practice	of	law.111	
The	resolution	to	create	the	rule	was	co-sponsored	by	a	number	of	
	
and	the	Law,	14	ASIAN	AM.	L.J.	165,	181	(2007).	
106 See	Bandsuch,	supra	note	92,	at	983.	
107 See	id.	at	983–84.	
108 See	Clements,	supra	note	58,	at	179.	
109 See	Levi,	supra	note	66,	at	366.	
110 Bandsuch,	supra	note	92,	at	983.	
111 MODEL	RULES	OF	PROF’L	CONDUCT	r.	8.4(g)	(AM.	BAR	ASS’N	2016)	(emphasis	added).	
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ABA	committees,	sections,	and	commissions,	including	the	Diversity	&	
Inclusion	360	Commission	and	the	Commission	on	Sexual	Orientation	
and	Gender	Identity.112	The	first	to	speak	in	favor	of	the	resolution	was	
Chair	of	the	ABA	Commission	on	Sexual	Orientation	and	Gender	Iden-
tity,	who	shared	that,	years	prior,	he	had	been	passed	over	by	a	law	firm	
hiring	committee	because	he	 is	gay.113	This	recent	amendment	to	the	
professional	conduct	rules	suggests	that,	even	absent	a	civil	remedy	for	
those	who	experience	discrimination	due	to	a	gendered	dress	code,	law-
yers	 may	 begin	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	 gendered	 attire	 norms	
based	on	their	ethical	duty	to	foster	an	inclusive	profession.	
As	of	June	2019,	just	two	states—Vermont	and	Maine—had	adopted	
versions	of	the	new	ABA	model	rule,	though	about	half	the	states	have	
some	 anti-discrimination	 rule	 that	 predates	 the	 ABA’s	model	 rule.114	
Professional	discipline	for	engaging	in	discrimination	by	virtue	of	prom-
ulgating	or	enforcing	gendered	appearance	standards	seems	highly	un-
likely.115	Thus,	economic	forces	are	more	likely	than	ethical	rules	to	re-
shape	lawyer	behavior.116			
Historically,	 the	 practice	 of	 law	 has	 been	 a	male	 endeavor—and	 a	
straight,	white	male	 endeavor	 at	 that—though	women	and	other	un-
derrepresented	groups	have	diversified	the	profession,	breaking	down	
barriers	 in	 growing	 numbers	 over	 recent	 decades.117	 Institutional	
changes	have	facilitated	some	of	this	transformation.		For	example,	law	
	
112 See	Lorelei	Laird,	Discrimination	and	Harassment	will	be	Legal	Ethics	Violations	Under	ABA	
Model	Rule,	ABA	J.	(Aug.	8,	2016	,	6:3	6		PM),		http://www.abajournal.com/news/arti-
cle/house_of_delegates_strongly_agrees_to_rule_making_discrimination_and_harass.		
113 See	id.	
114 See	Debra	Cassens	Weiss,	Second	State	Adopts	ABA	Model	Rule	Barring	Discrimination	and	
Harassment	by	Lawyers,	ABA	J.	(June	13,	2019,	11:39	AM),	http://www.abajournal.com/news/ar-
ticle/second-state-adopts-aba-model-rule-barring-discrimination-by-lawyers.		
115 See	generally	Alison	J.	Hartwell,	Makeup	for	Success:	Why	Jespersen	v.	Harrah’s	Stifles	Diver-
sity	by	Promoting	Stereotypes	in	Employment,	13	CARDOZO	J.	L.	&	GENDER	407,	408	(2007)	(“Courts	
have	not	been	impressed	with	employees’	interests	in	determining	their	own	appearance,	and	have	
repeatedly	legitimated	employers’	regulation	of	employee	appearance.”).	
116 See	 John	 S.	 Dzienkowski,	 Ethical	 Decisionmaking	 and	 the	 Design	 of	 Rules	 of	 Ethics,	 42	
HOFSTRA	L.	REV.	55,	72	(2013)	(“[F]ew	will	deny	that	 the	economics	of	 law	practice	significantly	
influence	lawyer	behavior.”).	
117 See	Jennifer	Cheeseman	Day,	Number	of	Women	Lawyers	At	Record	High	But	Men	Still	High-
est	 Earners,	 U.	 S.	 CENSUS	 BUREAU	 (May	 08,	 2018),	 https://www.census.gov/library/sto-
ries/2018/05/women-lawyers.html;	 see	 also	 Debra	 Cassens	Weiss,	 Law	 Firm	 Diversity	 is	 ‘good	
news/bad	news	story,’	Says	NALP	Executive	Director,	ABA	J.	 (Jan.	9,	2019),	 	http://www.abajour-
nal.com/news/article/law-firm-diversity-is-bad-news-good-news-story-nalp-executive-director-
says	(“The	overall	percentage	of	minority	associates	continues	to	increase	at	law	firms,	both	year	
over	 year	 and	 since	 2009.”).	 	 In	 1960,	 just	 four	 percent	 of	 lawyers	were	women,	 but	 by	 1993,	
twenty-five	percent	of	lawyers	were	women;	as	of	2018,	the	percentage	of	women	lawyers	has	in-
creased	to	thirty-eight	percent.	Day,	supra	note.	
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firms	 have	 become	more	 generous	with	 respect	 to	 parental	 leave.118	
They	have	introduced	part-time	and	flex-time	options,119	in	addition	to	
emergency	or	on-site	daycare,	to	support	parents	of	young	children.120		
With	the	help	of	technological	advances,	they	have	enhanced	flexibility	
by	permitting	more	telecommuting.121	These	innovations	have	all	facil-
itated	 shifts	 in	 demographics	 in	 the	 legal	 profession	 by	 signaling	 to	
women	and	other	parents	 that	 they	belong	and	by	creating	a	path	 to	
continued	advancement	in	the	face	of	family	transitions.	
But	 true	 inclusivity	 has	 proven	 evasive.122	 Through	 retention	 and	
promotion,	 legal	 employers	have	 stayed	close	 to	 their	original	demo-
graphic.123	 Junior	 attorneys	who	 do	 not	 feel	welcomed	 or	 supported	
pursue	 other	 professional	 opportunities.124	 Thus,	 while	 “non-tradi-
tional”	lawyers	enter	the	profession	in	increasing	numbers,	they	do	not	
remain	 or	 advance	 at	 the	 same	 rate	 as	 their	 straight,	 white,	 male	
peers.125	Additional,	intentional,	meaningful	change	designed	to	boost	
	
118 See,	e.g.,	Staci	Zaretsky,	The	Top	10	Law	Firms	For	Gender	Equity	&	Family-Friendly	Policies	
(2019),	ABOVE	THE	LAW	(Apr.	16,	2019),	https://abovethelaw.com/2019/04/the-top-10-law-firms-
for-gender-equity-family-friendly-policies-2019/.		
119 See	id.	
120 See	Angela	Morris,	Big	Law	Onsite	Day	Care:	The	Trend	That	Wasn’t,	THE	AMERICAN	LAWYER	
(Jan.	13,	2017),	https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202776873511/.		
121 See	Staci	Zaretsky,	More	Biglaw	Firms	Join	The	Future	of	Law	Practice	By	Offering	Telecom-
muting	Programs,	ABOVE	THE	L	AW	(Mar.	20,		2017,		1:42		P.M.),	
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/03/more-biglaw-firms-join-	the-future-of-law-practice-by-offer-
ing-telecommuting-programs/.		
122 See,	 e.g.,	 Kim	 Elsesser,	Female	 Lawyers	 Face	Widespread	 Gender	 Bias,	 According	 to	New	
Study,	 FORBES	 (Oct.	 1,	 2018),	 https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2018/10/01/female-
lawyers-face-widespread-gender-bias-according-to-new-study/#11944d724b55	(explaining	a	re-
cent	survey	that	indicated	female	lawyers,	and	especially	women	of	color,	are	more	likely	than	their	
male	counterparts	to	be	interrupted,	to	be	mistaken	for	non-lawyers,	to	do	more	office	housework,	
and	to	have	less	access	to	prime	job	assignments);	see	also	Allison	E.	Laffey	&	Allison	Ng,	Diversity	
and	 Inclusion	 in	 the	 Law:	 Challenges	 and	 Initiatives,	 AM.	 BAR	 ASS’N	 (May	 2,	 2018),	
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/jiop/articles/2018/diversity-and-
inclusion-in-the-law-challenges-and-initiatives/	(“Despite	the	increased	emphasis	on	diversity	and	
inclusion	within	the	legal	
field	over	the	past	decade	or	so,	the	legal	profession	remains	one	of	the	least	diverse	of	any	profes-
sion.”).		
123 See,	e.g.,	Veronica	Root,	Retaining	Color,	47	U.	MICH.	J.	L.	REFORM	575,	575	(2014)	(explaining	
that	large	law	firms	have	notable	problems	retaining	minority	attorneys).	
124 See	Janee	T.	Prince,	“Can	I	Touch	Your	Hair?”	Exploring	Double	Binds	and	the	Black	Tax	in	
Law	School,	20	U.	PA.	J.	L.	&	SOC.	CHANGE	29,	41	(2017)	(“Aside	from	not	feeling	valued,	women	of	
color	leave	law	firms	because	they	do	not	feel	supported	(twenty-two	percent	22%),	and	they	lack	
the	ability	to	establish	meaningful	relationships	(twenty-one	percent	21%).”).	
125 See,	e.g.,	Anusia	Gillespie,	The	Horrible	Conflict	Between	Biology	and	Women	Attorneys,	AM.	
BAR	 ASS’N,	 https://www.americanbar.org/careercenter/blog/the-horrible-conflict-between-biol-
ogy-and-women-attorneys/	(last	visited	Dec.	30,	2019)	(“[W]omen	have	comprised	around	47%	of	
graduating	law	school	classes	since	2000,	and	yet	women	represent	only	about	18%	of	equity	part-
ners	nationwide.”).		
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inclusivity	is	necessary	if	institutions	are	to	improve	the	retention	and	
advancement	of	non-traditional	lawyers.126	
Finding	ways	to	boost	retention	is	particularly	important	because	the	
population	of	the	United	States	is	becoming	increasingly	diverse,127	and	
clients	expect	lawyers	and	firms	to	keep	pace.128	Clients	want	access	to	
lawyers	they	trust	and	relate	to.129	Clients	also	want	to	partner	with	or-
ganizations	 that	 truly	 champion	 diversity	 and	 inclusion	 values,	 not	
those	that	merely	advertise	those	concepts,	so	some	clients	will	hire	out-
side	counsel	only	at	firms	that	are	able	to	demonstrate	a	commitment	to	
enhancing	diversity	in	the	legal	profession.130		
As	a	result,	law	firms	that	want	to	remain	competitive	must	adapt—
like	 employers	 across	 all	 disciplines—to	meet	 the	 changing	 expecta-
tions	of	job	applicants	and	employees.131	The	cultural	shift	that	has	re-
shaped	client	expectations	has	also	affected	the	legal	talent	that	employ-
ers	attract	and	retain.132	Generation	Z,	roughly	comprised	of	those	born	
between	1997	and	2012,133	 is	 just	beginning	 to	enter	 the	 legal	work-
force.134	The	New	York	Times	has	highlighted	Generation	Z’s	progres-
sive	perspective	on	identity,	noting	the	generation’s	acceptance	of	gen-
der-neutral	 pronouns.135	 The	 most	 diverse	 generation	 to	 date,136	
Generation	 Z	 highly	 values	 diversity	 and	 inclusion;	 indeed,	 seventy-
seven	 percent	 of	 Generation	 Z	 poll	 respondents	 reported	 that	 an	
	
126 See	generally	discussion	supra	notes	124	and	125.	
127 See	Hansi	Lo	Wang,	Generation	Z	Is	The	Most	Racially	And	Ethnically	Diverse	Yet,	NPR	(Nov.	
15,	2018.	10:11	A.M.),	https://www.npr.org/2018/11/15/668106376/generation-z-is-the-most-
racially-and-ethnically-diverse-yet.		
128 See	Daniel	S.	Wittenberg,	Corporate	Clients	Demand	More	Diversity	from	Law	Firms,	A.B.A.	
(June	20,		2017),	https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-
news/business-litigation/corporate-clients-demand-more-diversity-law-firms/.	
129 See	Matt	Lalande,	What	Potential	Clients	Look	For	When	They	Visit	Your	Legal	Site,	LAW	TECH.	
TODAY,	 (Feb.	 14,	 2019),	 https://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2019/02/this-is-what-potential-
clients-are-looking-for-when-they-visit-your-legal-site/.		
130 See	 Ben	 Seal,	 The	 2018	 Diversity	 Scorecard:	 The	 Rankings,	 AM.	 LAW.	 (May	 29,	 2018),	
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/05/29/the-2018-diversity-scorecard/.		
131 See	 The	 Law	 Society,	Horizon	 Scanning:	 Forward	 Thinking,	 (June	 2018),	 www.lawsoci-
ety.org.uk.		
132 See	Katie	Miserany,	Trying	to	recruit	Gen	Z?	Focus	on	D&I,	SURVEYMONKEY,	https://www.sur-
veymonkey.com/curiosity/trying-to-recruit-gen-z-focus-on-di/	(last	accessed	Dec.	30,	2019).			
133 See	Michael	Dimock,	Defining	generations:	Where	Millennials	End	and	Generation	Z	Degins,	
PEW	RES.	CTR.	 (Jan.	17,	2019),	https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-mil-
lennials-end-and-generation-z-begins/.		
134 See	Tyler	Paige,	Gen	Z	Is	Coming	to	Your	Office.	Get	Ready	to	Adapt.,	AALL	STREET	J.	(Sept.	6,	
2018),	https://www.wsj.com/graphics/genz-is-coming-to-your-office/.		
135 See	Dan	Levin,	Generation	Z:	Who	They	Are,	in	Their	Own	Words,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Mar.	28,	2019),	
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/us/gen-z-in-their-words.html.		
136 See	Wang,	supra	note	127.	
HANLEY	&	MACWILLIAMSON	MACRO.DOCX	(DO	NOT	DELETE)	 3/7/21		3:49	PM	
2021]	 MODEL	DRESS	CODE	 147	
	
employer’s	diversity	will	affect	their	decision	about	whether	to	accept	
an	employment	offer.137	
In	short,	progressive	action	is	an	investment	that	will	yield	desired—
and	elusive—dividends	for	legal	employers	in	the	form	of	employee	lon-
gevity	and	 loyalty.138	The	 leaky	pipeline	of	diverse	 talent	creates	em-
ployer	costs	and	should	be	a	concern.139	In	light	of	new	perspectives	on	
gender	and	identity,	genderless	dress	codes	may	be	the	next	step	legal	
employers	 should	pursue	 to	 reduce	 the	 judgment	 and	discrimination	
that	impair	non-binary	employees’	ability	to	contribute	and	advance	in	
the	workplace.	
Legal	employers	do	face	risk	in	adopting	a	genderless	dress	code	and	
enforcing	that	code	in	a	gender-neutral	way.		Welcoming	professionals	
to	wear	work-appropriate	attire	consistent	with	the	employees’	authen-
tic	selves	may	alienate	traditional	clients,	prospective	clients,	judges,	or	
other	economically	important	audiences,	a	risk	that	is	more	pronounced	
in	conservative	communities	than	in	progressive	ones.140	And,	in	certain	
instances,	attire	that	does	not	conform	with	the	expectations	of	a	deci-
sion-maker	presents	a	risk	of	prejudicing	client	interests.141	
Still,	 to	 attract,	 support,	 and	 retain	a	diverse	 community	of	profes-
sionals,	employers	should	invite	lawyers	to	wear	any	professional	attire	
in	which	 they	can	comfortably,	 capably,	 competently,	 and	confidently	
perform	 their	 duties.	 	 This	 invitation	will	 reduce	 the	 distracting	 and	
damaging	pressure,	experienced	acutely	by	gender-non-binary	lawyers,	
to	evade	workplace	discrimination	by	performing	an	inauthentic	iden-
tity.142	 By	 embracing	 genderless	 attire	 standards,	 confronting	 their	
	
137 See	Benjamin	Ho	&	Caroline	Pham,	 INSIGHT:	Generation	Z—What	Employers	Can	Expect	
Within	 the	 Next	 Generation	 of	 Workers,	 BLOOMBERG	 LAW	 (Aug.	 8,	 2019,	 4:01	 AM),	
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/insight-generation-z-what-employers-can-
expect-with-the-next-generation-of-workers;	see	also	Miserany,	supra	note	132.	Millennials,	indi-
viduals	in	the	generation	immediately	preceding	Generation	Z,	born	approximately	1981	through	
1996,	similarly	value	diversity.	See	also	Ryan	Jenkins,	How	Generation	Z	Will	Transform	the	Future	
Workplace,	INC.	(Jan.	15,	2019),	https://www.inc.com/ryan-jenkins/the-2019-workplace-7-ways-
generation-z-will-shape-it.html	(“69	percent	of	Millennials	employed	at	a	diverse	organization	said	
they	would	stay	with	their	employer	beyond	five	years,	compared	with	27	percent	not	employed	
at	a	diverse	organization.”).	
138 See	Jenkins,	supra	note	137.	
139 See	generally	id.	
140 The	overall	percentage	of	LGBTQ	lawyers	is	3.8	percent	among	associates	and	2.11	percent	
among	partners.	There	are	widespread	geographic	differences,	however.	About	55	percent	of	the	
reported	LGBTQ	 lawyers	are	accounted	 for	by	 just	 four	 cities:	Los	Angeles;	New	York	City;	 San	
Francisco	and	Washington,	D.C.”		Weiss,	supra	note	117.	
141 See	 Bea	 Bischoff,	 I	 Dress	 ‘Straight’	 to	 Protect	 My	 Clients,	 RACKED	 (July	 5,	 2017),	
https://www.racked.com/2017/7/5/15874342/queer-lawyer-straightness-performance.		
142 See	 Leslie	Culver,	Conscious	 Identity	Performance,	 55	SAN	DIEGO	L.	REV.	 577,	579	 (2018),	
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biases,	and	suppressing	their	risk	aversion	in	the	interest	of	expanding	
inclusivity,	lawyers	can	serve	as	leaders	within	and	beyond	the	profes-
sion.	
	
CONCLUSION	
	
Drafting	a	dress	code—any	dress	code—is	a	useful	first	step;	it	helps	
ensure	that	no	employee	suffers	for	deviating	from	a	set	of	unwritten	
rules	that	are	second-nature	to	some	new	hires	yet	entirely	unknown	by	
others.143	But	making	that	dress	code	genderless	is	also	important.			
A	genderless	dress	code	confirms	that	all	employees,	no	matter	their	
gender,	are	held	to	the	same	standards	and	equally	permitted	to	profes-
sionally	 express	 their	 identity	 in	 their	 workplace.	 	 Such	 an	 inclusive	
communication	would	signal	that	what	the	employer	values	in	its	em-
ployees	is	work	ethic,	work	quality,	and	professionalism—not	conform-
ity	with	a	particular	gender	performance.	
The	need	to	move	forward	in	this	manner	is	particularly	pronounced	
for	legal	employers,	which	have	an	ethical	obligation	to	avoid	discrimi-
nation	as	well	as	a	business	interest	in	fostering	an	inclusive	work	envi-
ronment.			
In	short,	gender,	a	social	construct,	is	not	binary.		Professional	attire	
rules	for	lawyers	should	not	be	binary	either.	
	 	
	
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3036768	 (“People	 in	 the	 legal	 profession	
from	traditionally	marginalized	groups—termed	‘outsiders’—sometimes	feel	pressure	to	perform	
strategies	to	communicate	their	identity	in	a	predominantly	white,	heterosexual,	male	profession.		
Building	upon	outsider	strategies	to	combat	prejudice	or	assimilate,	which	legal	scholarship	de-
scribes	in	terms	such	as	covering	and	passing,	the	diversity	crisis	in	the	legal	profession	signals	the	
need	for	a	deeper	understanding	of	identity	communication	and	strategies.”).	
143 See	Kim	Durant,	What	Are	 the	Benefits	 of	 Setting	a	Dress	 Code	 in	 the	Workplace,	 CHRON,	
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/benefits-setting-dress-code-workplace-22655.html		
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APPENDIX:	MODEL	DRESS	CODE144	
	
A. What	to	Wear	
	
i. Formal	 is	 sometimes	 required.	 	 For	 court	 appearances	 and	
any	formal,	in-person	interactions	with	clients,	prospective	
clients,	 witnesses,	 opposing	 counsel,	 or	 court	 personnel,	
wear	formal	business	attire.	
a. Business	suit	with	 jacket	or	an	equivalently	formal	
outfit	intended	for	a	professional	workplace,	wit	
b. Leather	 (or	 faux	 leather)	 loafers,	 lace-up	 loafers,	
pumps,	flats,	or	boots,	and	
c. Complementary	 accessories,	 like	 a	 belt,	 necktie,	
scarf,	dark	socks,	hosiery,	or	jewelry	
	
ii. But	business	casual	is	the	general	norm.	 	At	all	other	times,	
casual	professional	clothing,	like	the	following,	is	acceptable:	
a. Slacks,	khaki	pants,	skirts,	and	dresses	
b. Button-down	shirts	and	blouses	
c. Fitted	sweaters,	vests,	and	blazers	
	
iii. Some	items	are	too	casual	for	business	hours.		The	following	
items	are	not	acceptable	 in	 the	office	at	any	 time,	Monday	
through	Friday:	
a. Denim	
b. Stretch	pants,	leggings,	and	athletic	tights	
c. Shorts	
d. Tank	 tops,	 halter	 tops,	 midriff-revealing	 tops,	 and	
scoop-	or	v-neck	tops	that	are	cut	low	in	the	front	or	
back	
e. Athletic	shoes,	water	shoes,	and	flip	flops	
	
	
	
144 This	model	ungendered,	professional	dress	code	was	drafted	in	an	effort	to	avoid	perpetu-
ating	harmful	stereotypes	based	on	the	gender-binary	fiction.		Each	law	office	can	tailor	this	code	
to	address	office	atmosphere	along	with	the	region’s	seasonal	and	cultural	climates.		The	authors	
take	no	position	as	to	whether	the	level	of	formality	captured	by	this	model	code	is	appropriate	or	
necessary;	rather,	we	provide	this	template	as	an	example	of	an	effort	to	create	and	clearly	com-
municate	a	set	of	expectations	that	do	not	default	to	outdated	gender	norms.	
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B. Other	Considerations	
	
i. Fit.	 	 The	width	 and	 length	 of	 all	 clothing	 components,	 like	
pant	legs	and	sleeves,	should	fit.		Clothing	that	is	excessively	
tight/loose	or	short/long	may	be	unacceptable.		A	tailor	may	
be	able	to	advise	and	assist	with	any	necessary	adjustments:	
[list	local	tailor	names].	
	
ii. Quality.		While	professional	attire	tends	to	be	fashioned	from	
elevated	fabrics	(e.g.,	not	jersey	knit,	or	t-shirt,	fabric),	cloth-
ing	need	not	be	from	any	particular	store	or	designer;	need	
not	be	purchased	new;	and	need	not	be	expensive.	
	
iii. Condition.	 	Clothing	should	be	clean;	pressed	and/or	free	of	
wrinkles;	and	free	of	holes	and/or	frayed	edges.	
	
iv. Logos.		Small	(up	to	the	size	of	a	quarter,	roughly)	brand	logos	
are	acceptable;	large	graphic	images	are	not.	
	
	
